In Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus Software (September 13, 2006), the Federal Circuit agreed that the phrase "colorant selection mechanism" should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation in claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,500,919 (the "'919 patent"):
- A system for reproducing a color original in a medium using a selected multiplicity of reproduction colorants, the system comprising in serial order:
- a scanner for producing from said color original a set of three tristimulus appearance signals dependent on the colors in said original;
- display means connected to the scanner for receiving the appearance signals and aesthetic correction circuitry for interactively introducing aesthetically desired alterations into said appearance signals to produce modified appearance signals; and
- colorant selection mechanism for receiving said modified appearance signals and for selecting corresponding reproduction signals representing values of said reproducing colorants to produce in said medium a colorimetrically-matched reproduction.
According to the opinion of the court by Circuit Judge Dyk:
The phrase "colorant selection mechanism" is presumptively not subject to 112 ¶ 6 because it does not contain the term "means." CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, a limitation lacking the term "means" may overcome the presumption against means-plus-function treatment if it is shown that "the claim term fails to 'recite sufficiently definite structure' or else recites 'function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.'" Id. (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
We agree with the district court's conclusion that the presumption here is overcome and that the phrase "colorant selection mechanism" should be construed as a means-plus-function limitation. The generic terms "mechanism," "means," "element," and "device," typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure. In Personalized Media Commc'ns, LLC v. Int'l Trade Com'n, 161 F.3d 696 (Fed. Cir. 1998), we addressed the claim term "digital detector." We contrasted the term "detector," which recited sufficient structure to avoid 112 ¶ 6, with "generic structural term[s] such as 'means,' 'element,' or 'device,'" which do not. Id. at 704. Similarly, in Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we recognized that Section 112 ¶ 6 does not apply to "a term that is simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure and is simply a substitute for the term 'means for.'" Id. at 1360.
Here the patentee used "mechanism" and "means" as synonyms. See '919 patent, claim 3, col. 15 l. 51 (referring to "colorant selection means") (emphasis added); id., claim 14, col. 17 ll. 1-2 (same). At least one dictionary definition equates mechanism with means. See The Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. 1193 def. 2 (2d ed. 1998) (defining "mechanism" as "the agency or means by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished"); see also The Random House Dictionary of the English Language — The Unabridged Edition 889 (1973) (same). The term "mechanism" standing alone connotes no more structure than the term "means."
Claim language that further defines a generic term like "mechanism" can sometimes add sufficient structure to avoid 112 ¶ 6. For example, in Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which involved a mechanical device, we held that 112 ¶ 6 did not apply to the term "detent mechanism," because "the noun '[d]etent' denotes a type of device with a generally understood meaning in the mechanical arts, even though the definitions are expressed in functional terms." Id. at 1583. The court recited several dictionary definitions for "detent," including "a mechanism that temporarily keeps one part in a certain position relative to that of another, and can be released by applying force to one of the parts." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These definitions connoted sufficient structure to avoid 112 ¶ 6. We also concluded that "[t]he fact that a particular mechanism—here 'detent mechanism'—is defined in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a 'means for performing a specified function' within the meaning of [112 ¶ 6]" because "[m]any devices take their names from the functions they perform." Id. [Footnote here: Of course, a claim term defined solely in functional terms, without more, would fall within Section 112(6). See Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999).]
In contrast, the term "colorant selection," which modifies "mechanism" here, is not defined in the specification and has no dictionary definition, and there is no suggestion that it has a generally understood meaning in the art. We therefore agree with the district court that "colorant selection mechanism" does not connote sufficient structure to a person of ordinary skill in the art to avoid 112 ¶ 6 treatment. [Footnote here: In Lighting World, we held that it was appropriate to look to dictionaries "to determine if a disputed term has achieved recognition as a noun denoting structure," and determined that "connector" had a reasonably well-understood meaning as a name for a structure. 382 F.3d at 1360-61. That structure was defined in terms of the function it performed, "connecting." Id. Here, the term "mechanism" is not defined by a function that particularizes its structure.]
The district court found that the functions of the "colorant selection mechanism," as recited in claim 1, are "receiving said modified appearance signals" and "selecting corresponding reproduction signals representing values of said reproduction colorants to produce in said medium a colorimetrically-matched reproduction." The court further held that the corresponding structures are the components of the "ink correction module (ICM)." MIT does not argue that if means-plus-function treatment was appropriate, the district court erred in its conclusions regarding the function and corresponding structure of the term. Therefore, the district court's construction will govern further proceedings.
Claim 1(b) of the '919 patent recites, "display means connected to the scanner for receiving the appearance signals and aesthetic correction circuitry for interactively introducing aesthetically desired alterations into said appearance signals to produce modified appearance signals." '919 patent, col. 15, ll. 37-41 (emphasis added). The phrase, "aesthetic correction circuitry for interactively introducing aesthetically desired alterations into said appearance signals to produce modified appearance signals," does not contain the term "means," and is therefore presumptively not a means-plus-function limitation. Nonetheless, the district court held that the presumption was overcome and proceeded to define the function and related structure.
MIT urges that the term "aesthetic correction circuitry" connotes sufficient structure to avoid 112 ¶ 6 treatment. We agree. . . .
This is the first decision in which the Federal Circuit has upheld a mean-plus-function claim construction where the claim did not literally recite the word "means." "It is certainly difficult enough to interpret a 'means' term stated as such," comments Professor Wegner. "The difficulties with determining when to give a non-means limitation a 'means' interpretation, as here, geometrically confuses the issue even further."
Indeed, Chief Judge Michel would have gone further to also construe the "aesthetic correction circuitry" as means-plus-function claim language, despite the absence of the term "means for," in view of the presence of functional language because the limitation fails to recite sufficiently definite structure. According to the dissent:
The district court correctly interpreted "aesthetic correction circuitry" as a means-plus-function claim despite the absence of the term "means for" in view of the presence of functional language because the limitation fails to recite sufficiently definite structure, as our precedent requires. Thus, the presumption against application of section 112, paragraph 6 was overcome. . . .
. . . [N]ot every "adjectival qualification" ("A.Q."), connotes sufficiently definite structure for the term "circuit," but rather an "appropriate" A.Q., as demonstrated in Apex by technical dictionaries.
. . . . Unlike in Apex, here we have no evidence whatsoever that "aesthetic correction" is such an "appropriate" A.Q. that it would connote sufficiently definite structure to one skilled in the art. Indeed, "aesthetic correction" itself may be solely functional language. For example, we were shown no evidence that any technical dictionaries suggest to the artisan a sufficiently definite structure for "aesthetic correction circuitry" or even list such a term. Nor did experts from either side opine that one skilled in the art would understand "aesthetic correction circuitry" to connote sufficiently definite circuit structure.
While Microsoft's expert Anthony Johnson stated that one skilled in the art would have understood "aesthetic correction circuitry" to mean "hardware that allows an operator to interactively introduce changes into the appearance signals to create modified appearance signals," this does not connote definite structure, but merely some unspecified hardware structure. The record on appeal does not reflect the opinion of MIT's expert, Bradley Paxton, regarding the meaning of "aesthetic correction circuitry." Rather, in the paltry portion of his testimony in the appellate record, he merely discusses "circuitry" and the fact that "[c]ircuitry contains a lot of components, including wires."
This fails to impart definite structure to "aesthetic correction circuitry" because the components and their arrangements are unstated. The inventor, William Schreiber, explained that "aesthetic correction circuitry" means to one skilled in the art "hardware or software used by the system operator to introduce desired alterations into the appearance signals of an image." Again, this does not elucidate a definite structure, but merely suggests some generic structure, namely, some unspecified arrangement of unidentified hardware components or software. Neither of MIT's experts even attempted to opine that "aesthetic correction" connotes definite structure such that "aesthetic correction circuitry" would suggest a sufficiently definite array of components to one skilled in the art. Thus, I cannot discern sufficiently definite structure from the term "aesthetic correction circuitry" to avoid means-plus-function treatment.
. . . Here, we face a description of only the circuit's function, not of how it operates with other circuits or devices to carry out that function. Moreover, even assuming we had a description of the circuit's operation, "for interactively introducing aesthetically desired alterations into said appearance signals to produce modified appearance signals," '919 patent, col. 15, ll. 38-41, we were shown no evidence from which to conclude that this description identifies the circuit components or conveys the arrangement of circuit components to one skilled in the art so that he could draw the circuit's elements and their sequence.
In sum, both Apex and Linear relied on additional information in the claim to determine whether the limitation as a whole conveyed sufficiently definite circuit structure, i.e., elements or components and their sequence, to an artisan. Apex relied on dictionary definitions of an accompanying "appropriate" A.Q. that suggested sufficiently definite structure to one skilled in the art. Linear relied on expert testimony that the claim's description of the operation of the circuit connoted definite structure. Here, we have neither a dictionary definition to establish that "aesthetic correction" is an appropriate A.Q. to suggest definite structure nor expert testimony that the accompanying description of the operation of the circuit, if any, connotes definite circuit structure—sequence of particular circuit components—to an artisan so that he could draw on paper the arrangement of the components needed.
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